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ABSTRACT
In this paper, a game theoretic approach is used to derive the
optimal power allocation in multiple access channels (MAC)
for decentralized systems. Unlike previous results, a simple
coordination mechanism is used between selfish users. The
nature and influence of the coordination mechanism is stud-
ied in details for single antenna and multiple antenna termi-
nals. In the proposed framework, the coordination signal in-
dicates to the users in which order the receiver applies suc-
cessive interference cancelation and with which frequency this
order is used: it establishes the rule of the game. Remark-
ably, in Gaussian single input single output MACs, it is shown
that, whatever the rule of the game, the selfish behavior of the
users leads to a socially efficient network that is to say it is al-
ways sum-capacity achieving. However, for fast fading MAC
with multi-antenna terminals, there can be a performance gap
between the decentralized system and its centralized counter-
part. Analytical and simulation results are provided to assess
this gap.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a special case of decentralized
wireless networks, the decentralized multiple access chan-
nel (MAC). In this specific context, the MAC consists of a
network of several mobile stations (MS) and one fixed base
station (BS). The network is said to be decentralized in the
sense that the base station does not dictate to the users the
information rates and transmit power levels. Hence, each
user can choose freely its power allocation policy in order
to selfishly maximize a certain individual performance cri-
terion.
The problem of decentralized power allocation in wire-
less networks is not new and has been properly formalized
for the first time in [1]. Interestingly, the problem can be
formulated quite naturally as a non-cooperative game with
different performance criteria (utilities) such as the carrier
to interference ratio [2], aggregate throughput [3] or energy
efficiency [4][5]. In this paper, the point of view adopted
is close to the one proposed by the authors of [6] for the
DSL (digital subscriber lines) systems, [7] for the single in-
put single output (SISO) and the single input multiple out-
put (SIMO) fast fading multiple access channels with CSIR,
CSIT (Channel State Information at the Transmitter and Re-
ceiver) and [8] for MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output)
with CSIR but only channel distribution information at the
transmitters (CDIT). More precisely, we assume, as in [7],
that the users want to maximize information-theoretic utili-
ties and more precisely their transmission rate. However our
approach differs from [7] on several key technical points.
In [7] the authors proposed different formulations (in par-
ticular the Stackelberg and repeated games formulations) to
try to obtain achievable rate regions as close as possible to
the centralized MAC capacity region. The corresponding
formulations and assumptions made, especially that of the
knowledge of all the instantaneous channels at each mobile
station, is not applicable to large decentralized networks. In
this paper, two key assumptions are made in order to fur-
ther minimize base station signaling towards the mobiles:
the base station can only send to the users a simple coordi-
nation signal and sufficient training signals for the users to
know the statistics of the different channels. If the channels
are stationary the training data will be sent once and for
all. The assumed coordination signal is simple because it
consists in sending periodically the realization of a K!-state
random signal, where K is the number of active users. Note
that the framework of this paper is not that of coordination
games [14]. Rather, the proposed formulation can be seen
from two different standpoints. If the distribution of the co-
ordination signal is fixed, than the addressed problem can
be seen as a non-cooperative game where the base station is
imposed to follow the realizations of the random coordina-
tion signal, which can be generated by any device (and not
necessarily the base station), in order to select its strategy
(decoding order). On the other hand, if the distribution of
the coordination signal can be optimized, the problem will
be addressed following a Stackelberg formulation where the
base station is the game leader and wants to maximize the
network uplink sum-rate by choosing its best mixed strategy
(namely a distribution over the possible decoding orders).
Additionally to the assumptions just mentioned, we will
assume that both the mobile and base stations are equipped
with multiple antennas. Therefore we make the same as-
sumptions as [8] where the authors investigated non-cooperative
and non-coordinated MIMO MACs when single-user de-
coding is assumed at the base station. In our framework
the main objective is to know how well a non-cooperative
but weakly coordinated system performs in terms of overall
sum-rate w.r.t. its centralized counterpart when successive
decoding is used at the base station.
In this setting, several interesting questions arise.
• When the user’s utility functions are chosen to be
their individual transmission rate, is there a Nash equi-
librium in the corresponding game and is it unique?
• What is the optimum way of allocating spatially and
temporally the transmit power for a selfish user?
• How to choose the coordination signal in order for the
network sum-rate to be maximized?
In Sec. 2, we begin by considering the SISO static mul-
tiple access channel, which is a simple case that provides
insights on the stated issues. Then, in Sec. 3 we consider
a more attractive framework for wireless networks, which
is the fast fading MIMO MAC channel. First we outline
the general problem which consists in determining for each
user, its optimal space-time power distribution. Then we
restrict our attention to two important special cases. In the
first case, the spatial correlation between the transmit anten-
nas is assumed to be absent. In this case the optimal spatial
power allocation is the uniform power allocation, and the
time allocation problem is studied. For the second case, we
assume that the temporal power allocation is uniform and
thus our objective is to derive the best spatial power alloca-
tion scheme. Numerical results are provided in Sec. 4. We
conclude by several remarks and possible extensions of our
work.
Note: for simplicity sake and without loss of generality,
we will assume MACs with two users. However, all the
results presented in this paper extend to K−user MACs,
K ≥ 3. In this respect, in some places K will be used
instead of K = 2.
2. GAUSSIAN SISO MULTIPLE ACCESS
CHANNELS
In this section we consider a simple case of MACs that cap-
tures several important aspects of the problem and serves as
baseline example. The two links between the two mobile
and base stations are assumed to be static, namely additive
white Gaussian (AWGN) channels. We also assume termi-
nals with single antennas. The main feature of the system
under investigation is that the base station sends a coordi-
nation signal to the (two) users. To generate this signal the
base station flips a coin and transmits the corresponding bit,
which does not always convey one information bit. Indeed,
as this coin is not necessarily fair, it provides a degree of
freedom for the base station for optimizing the system per-
formance. The realization of the random signal indicates in
which order the base station decodes the users with a perfect
successive interference canceler. Note that in a real wireless
system the frequency to which the coin would be tossed is
roughly proportional to the inverse of the channel coherence
time. In the special case of the AWGN MAC, the links are
static and therefore the coherence time is infinite.
In order to translate mathematically the proposed coor-
dination scheme, let us denote by S ∈ S the coordination
signal where S = {1, 2} is the set of realizations of S and
Pr[S = 1] = p (resp. Pr[S = 2] = 1− p) is the probability
that user 1 (resp. user 2) is decoded the second and therefore
sees no multiple access interference. The signal received by
the base station for the realization s ∈ {1, 2} of the coordi-
nation signal writes as: Y (s) =
∑2
k=1 hkX
(s)
k +Z
(s), where
hk the channel gain for user k, X
(s)
k is the signal transmitted
by user k when the realization of the coordination signal is
s, and for all s, Z(s) ∼ N (0, σ2) is the (stationary) channel
noise. Note that the channel gains are assumed to be known
both from the transmitters and receiver. As these gain do
not vary over time in this section, acquiring the knowledge
of them is not a critical issue here. This can be done once
and for all with an arbitrary small loss for the average trans-
mission rate. The chosen transmit power constraints are as
follows:
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, pE
∣∣∣X(1)k ∣∣∣2 + pE ∣∣∣X(2)k ∣∣∣2 ≤ Pk (1)
We will use the following notations: p1 = p, p1 = p =
1 − p, p2 = p = 1 − p and p2 = p. Also, let pkαk denote
the fraction that user k dedicates to the situation where he
sees an interference-free channel i.e. E
∣∣∣X(1)1 ∣∣∣2 = α1P1
and E
∣∣∣X(2)2 ∣∣∣2 = α2P2. Thus the strategy of a user consists
in choosing αk in order to maximize its utility which is his
individual average transmission rate. The utility function
for user k ∈ {1, 2} is given by:
uk(αk, α−k) = pk log (1 + αkηk)+pk log
[
1 +
(1− αkpk)ηk
pk(1 + η−kα−k)
]
(2)
where the notation a−k stands for the value of the quan-
tity a for the other user and ηk =
|hk|
2Pk
σ2
. Given the fact
that each user wants to maximize its own utility uk w.r.t.
αk ∈
[
0, 1
pk
]
, the main issue is to know if there exists an
equilibrium (i.e. no user has interest in deviating from this
point), if it is unique and how to determine the correspond-
ing pair of parameters (α∗1, α
∗
2). In fact, the existence and
uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) issues can be dealt
with by applying Theorem 1 and 2 of [9] in our context.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium. The existence is in-
sured because of the geometrical and topological properties
of the functions uk, and of the set over which the maximiza-
tion is performed. For each user k ∈ {1, 2}, the function uk
is (strictly) concave in αk and continuous in (α1, α2). For
each user k ∈ {1, 2}, the set of feasible actions or strategies
Ak =
[
0, 1
pk
]
is convex and compact. The conditions of [9]
for the existence of a NE are therefore met.
Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Here, our goal is
to prove that the diagonally strict concavity condition of [9]
is met in our context and therefore there is a unique NE.
For all (α′1,α
′′
1) ∈ A
2
1 and (α
′
2,α
′′
2) ∈ A
2
2 such that either
α′1 6= α
′′
1 or α
′
2 6= α
′′
2 we want to prove that:
C =
{
(α′′1 − α
′
1)
[
∂u1
∂α1
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂u1
∂α1
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
(3)
+(α′′2 − α
′
2)
[
∂u2
∂α2
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂u2
∂α2
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]}
> 0.
By denoting the two terms of each utility function of eq. (2)
as uk = R
(1)
k + R
(2)
k the strict positivity condition can be
rewritten as follows:
C = pT1 + (1− p)T2 > 0 (4)
where for all s ∈ {1, 2},
Ts = (α
′′
1 − α
′
1)
[
∂R
(s)
1
∂α1
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂R
(s)
1
∂α1
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
(5)
+(α′′2 − α
′
2)
[
∂R
(s)
2
∂α2
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂R
(s)
2
∂α2
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
.
The term T1 can be re-expressed and shown to be positive:
T1 =
{
p(α′′1−α
′
1)
2η21
(1+α′1η1)(1+α
′′
1 η1)
+
p(1−p)2(α′′2−α
′
2)
2η22−(α
′′
1−α
′
1)(α
′′
2−α
′
2)p
2(1−p)η1η2
(p(1+α′1η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′
2)(p(1+α
′′
1 η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′′
2 )
}
≥
p3(α′′1−α
′
1)
2η21+p(1−p)
2(α′′2−α
′
2)
2η22−p
2(1−p)(α′′1−α
′
1)(α
′′
2−α
′
2)η1η2
(p(1+α′1η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′
2)(p(1+α
′′
1 η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′′
2 )
> 0
(6)
In the same way, T2 can be shown to be positive, which
concludes the proof of the uniqueness of the NE.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to find
the optimal selfish strategies in the sets of actions A1 and
A2 we introduce four Lagrange multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) ∈
[0, +∞[4 and define the two constrained functions{
L1(α1, α2, λ1) = −u1(α1, α2) + λ1(α1 −
1
p
)− λ2α1
L2(α1, α2, λ2) = −u2(α1, α2) + λ3(α2 −
1
1−p )− λ4α2.
(7)
The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions write as:

λ1
(
α∗1 −
1
p
)
= 0
λ2α
∗
1 = 0
λ3
(
α∗2 −
1
1−p
)
= 0
λ4α
∗
2 = 0.
(8)
By setting the derivative of the constrained utility functions
to zero (7) and using the KT conditions (8) one can check
that the pair of parameters at the Nash equilibrium is given
by:
(α∗1, α
∗
2) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
p
, 11−p
)
if η2
η1
= 1−p
p(
1
p
, 1 + η1
η2
)
if η2
η1
> 1−p
p(
1 + η2
η1
, 11−p
)
if η2
η1
< 1−p
p
.
(9)
Interestingly, we observe that for a fixed game rule, which
is the value of parameter p, there will always be an equi-
librium. The users adapt their strategies to the rule of the
game accordingly to eq. (9) in order to optimize their in-
dividual transmission rates (2). The base station can there-
fore choose its strategy p to optimize the overall network
performance: p∗ = arg maxp Rsum(p), where Rsum(p) =
u1 [α
∗
1(p), α
∗
2(p)] + u2 [α
∗
1(p), α
∗
2(p)]. It can be checked
that for the three regimes we defined from the ratio η2
η1
(see
eq. (9)), at the equilibrium, the sum-rate is a constant and
Rsum(p) = log(1 + η1 + η2). In fact, this constant is the
sum-capacity of the centralized Gaussian SISO MAC. This
shows that for any rule of the game, even if it is unfair, the
selfish behavior of the users will always lead to maximiz-
ing the network sum-rate. Of course, the base station can
always chose p = 12 (fair coin) in order to make the game
fair without affecting the network performance in the case
of Gaussian SISO multiples access channels. However, in
general, the proven result means that any binary coordina-
tion signal can be used (1-bit quantization of an FM signal,
pseudo-random noise generator, etc.) without loss of global
optimality.
One can easily check that varying p from 0 to 1 allows
one to move along the sum-rate (or full cooperation) seg-
ment of centralized Gaussian MAC capacity region, which
is a pentagon. The main question that arises is to know to
what extent the obtained results apply to the fading MIMO
MAC. Indeed, it is known that for the centralized fading
MIMO channels, there is generally only one point where
the sum-capacity is achieved and therefore there must be
some differences to be identified. This is the purpose of the
next section.
3. LARGE FADING MIMOMULTIPLE ACCESS
CHANNELS
3.1. System Model
Notations: The notations v and M will stand for vector and
matrix respectively. The superscripts (.)T and (.)H will de-
note transpose and transpose conjugate, respectively. The
trace of the matrix M will be denoted by Tr(M).
Now each mobile station is equipped with nt antennas
whereas the base station has nr antennas (thus we assume
the same number of transmitting antennas for all the users).
In our analysis the flat fading channel matrices of the differ-
ent links vary from symbol vector (or space-time codeword)
to symbol vector. We assume that the receiver knows all the
channel matrices whereas each transmitter has only access
to the statistics of the different channels. The equivalent
baseband signal received by the base station can be written
as
y(s)(τ) =
K∑
k=1
Hk(τ)x
(s)
k (τ) + z
(s)(τ) (10)
where x
(s)
k (τ) is the nt-dimensional column vector of sym-
bols transmitted by user k at time τ for the realization s
of the coordination signal, Hk(τ) ∈ Cnr×nt is the chan-
nel matrix (stationary and ergodic process) of user k and
z(s)(τ) is a nr-dimensional complex white Gaussian noise
distributed asN (0, σ2Inr ). For sake of clarity we will omit
the time index τ from our notations. In order to take into ac-
count the antenna correlation effects at the transmitters and
receiver we will assume the different channel matrices to be
structured according to the Kronecker propagation model
[10]:
∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}, Hk = R
1
2 ΘkT
1
2
k (11)
whereR is the receive antenna correlation matrix, Tk is the
transmit antenna correlation matrix for user k and Θk is an
nr×nt matrix whose entries are zero-mean independent and
identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables
with variance 1
nt
.
3.2. Space-time power allocation game
Now, in the vector case, the strategy of user k ∈ {1, 2}, con-
sists in choosing the best pair of precoding matrices Q
(s)
k =
E
[
x
(s)
k x
(s),H
k
]
, for s ∈ {1, 2}, in the sense of his utility
function:
u1(Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(2)
1 Q
(1)
2 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = pR
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
+(1− p)R
(2)
1 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 )
u2(Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(2)
1 Q
(1)
2 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = pR
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
+(1− p)R
(2)
2 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 )
(12)
where
R
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 |
R
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(1)
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 |
R
(2)
1 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(2)
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
R
(2)
2 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
(13)
with ρ = 1
σ2
The main point to mention here is the power
constraint under which the utilities are maximized. The vec-
tor version of the power constraint given in eq. (1) is:
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, pTr(Q
(1)
k ) + pTr(Q
(2)
k ) ≤ ntPk (14)
Obviously the optimum precoding matricesQ
(s,∗)
k (with (k, s) ∈
{1, 2}2) will depend on p. The problem of finding the cor-
responding matrices Q
(s,∗)
k (p) and then optimizing the sys-
tem sum-rate w.r.t. p is doable but requires more space to be
treated properly. In this paper we will restrict our attention
to two special but interesting cases:
1. Assumption 1. We assume the absence of spatial cor-
relation between the transmit antennas i.e. ∀k ∈ {1, 2},
Tk = I. Under this assumption, using the fact that
the payoff functions are strictly concave, and extend-
ing the results given in [11] for the single user chan-
nel, we obtain that the optimum precoding matrices
are proportional to the nt –dimensional identity ma-
trix (uniform spatial allocation), which allows us to
convert the space-time power allocation problem into
a purely temporal allocation problem (Sec. 3.3).
2. Assumption 2. Here we assume that the user are free
to share their transmit power between their antennas
but for each realization of the coordination signal the
transmit power is constrained as follows (uniform time
power allocation):
∀k ∈ {1, 2},∀s ∈ {1, 2},Tr(Q
(s)
k ) ≤ ntPk. (15)
This is a pure spatial power allocation problem (Sec.
3.4 ).
3.3. Temporal power allocation game
Under Assumption 1, the power constraint (14) becomes
pα
(1)
k + pα
(2)
k ≤ 1, which is exactly the power constraint
we had for Gaussian SISO channels (see eq. (1)). We will
use the same notations as in Sec. 2 (e.g. α
(1)
1 = α1). From
now on, we can investigate the same issues as in Sec. 2:
the existence of a NE, its uniqueness, its determination and
its social efficiency. Because of the lack of space we will
not provide all the details of the proofs but only a sketch of
them.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium. We apply [9] in our
matrix case. Without loss of generality, let us consider user
1. The utility of user 1 comprises two terms corresponding
to the two coordination signal realizations: u1(α1, α2) =
p1R
(1)
1 + p1R
(2)
1 . One can check that:
∂2R
(1)
1
∂α21
(α1, α2) = −ETr[BBH ] < 0
∂2R
(2)
1
∂α21
(α1, α2) = −ETr[CC
H ] < 0
(16)
where
B = ρ1H
H
1 (I + ρ1α1H1H
H
1 )
−1H1
C = p
1−p
ρ1H
H
1 (I + ρ1
1−pα1
1−p
H1H
H
1 + ρ2α2H2H
H
2 )
−1H1
(17)
with ρk ,
Pk
σ2
. Thus for each k, the utility uk is strictly
concave w.r.t. to αk. Also it is continuous in (α1, α2) over
the convex and compact sets Ak =
[
1, 1
pk
]
. Therefore the
existence of a NE is guaranteed.
Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We always apply
[9] in our matrix case and prove that the diagonally strict
concavity condition is always met. The key of the proof is
the following Lemma which will not be proved here.
Lemma 3.1 LetA′, A′′, B′ andB′′ be Hermitian and pos-
itive definite matrices such that either A′ 6= A′′ or B′ 6=
B′′. Then we have Tr(M + N) > 0 where
M = (A′′ −A′)
[
(I + A′)−1 − (I + A′′)−1
]
N = (B′′ −B′)
[
(I + B′ + A′)−1 − (I + B′′ + A′′)−1
]
.
(18)
The uniqueness of the NE can then be proved by following
the same steps as in the SISO case. The diagonally strict
concavity condition can exactly be written as equation (4)
but in the matrix case T1 can be checked to be equal to
Tr(M + N) with
M = (A′′ −A′)
[
(I + A′)−1 − (I + A′′)−1
]
N = (B′′ −B′)
[
(I + B′ + A′)−1 − (I + B′′ + A′′)−1
]
A′ = ρ1α
′
1H1H
H
1
A′′ = ρ1α
′′
1H1H
H
1
B′ = ρ2
1−(1−p)α′2
p
H2H
H
2
B′′ = ρ2
1−(1−p)α′′2
p
H2H
H
2 .
(19)
By using Lemma 3.1 twice, one can prove that T1 and T2
are positive, which ensures the unconditional uniqueness of
the NE in the considered game.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to ob-
tain the NE, we exploit a large system approach, derived in
[12] for the fading single user channels. This will lead us
to simple approximations of the utility functions which are
easier to optimize. From now on we assume the asymp-
totic regime in terms of the number of antennas: nt −→∞,
nr −→ ∞, and lim
nt→∞,nr→∞
nt
nr
= c < ∞. Under these
assumptions, for s = 1 (the expressions for s = 2 can be
written in a similar way) and each k ∈ {1, 2}, the rates R
1)
k
can be can be shown to be equivalent to [12]:
R˜
(1)
1 = nt log2(1 + ρ1α1γ1)+
+nr log2 (cγ1)− ntγ1 (cγ1 − 1) log2 e
R˜
(1)
2 = nt log2(1 + ρ1α1γ1)+
+nt log2
[
1 + 2ρ2
1−(1−p)α2
p
γ2
]
+
+nr log2 (2cγ2)− 4ntγ2 (cγ2 − 1) log2 e
−R˜
(1)
1
(20)
where the parameters γj , j ∈ {1, 2} are solutions of the
following 2−degree equations:
γ1 =
nr
nt
1
1 + ρ α1P1
1+ρα1P1γ1
γ2 =
nr
nt
1
+ρ
(
α1P1
1+2ρα1P1γ2
+ (1−(1−p)α2)P2
p+2ρ(1−(1−p)α2)P2γ2
)
(21)
The approximates of R˜
(1)
2 and R˜
(2)
1 can be obtained in a
similar way and the approximated utilities follows since:
u˜1(α1, α2) = pR˜
(1)
1 (α1, α2) + (1− p)R˜
(2)
1 (α1, α2)
u˜2(α1, α2) = pR˜
(1)
2 (α1, α2) + (1− p)R˜
(2)
2 (α1, α2).
(22)
Now in order to solve the constrained optimization problem,
we introduce the Lagrange multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) ∈
[0, +∞[4 and define the two functions:
L1(α1, α2, λ1) = −u˜1(α1, α2) + λ1(α1 −
1
p
)− λ2α1
L2(α1, α2, λ2) = −u˜2(α1, α2) + λ3(α2 −
1
1−p )− λ4α2.
(23)
The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions can be written in the same
way as in (8). Therefore the optimum selfish power allo-
cations can be obtained by using a fixed-point method and
an iterative algorithm following the same idea as in [8] for
non-coordinated MIMO MACs with single-user decoding.
At this point we have to make an important technical com-
ment. Our proof for the existence and uniqueness of the NE
holds for the exact game. For the approximated game, we
need the approximated utilities to have the same properties
as their exact counterparts. It turns out that the large sys-
tem approximation of the ergodic mutual information can
be shown to have the desired properties [13].
Now, let us focus on the network sum-rate. As the op-
timum precoding matrices are proportional to the identity
matrix, it can be checked that the sum-capacity of the con-
sidered decentralized MAC is reached for p = 0 and p = 1:
Rsum(p) = E log |I + ρ1H1HH1 + ρ2H2H
H
2 |. Unlike the
SISO case, it is not reached for any value of p. In partic-
ular, the fair choice p = 12 does not lead to a decentral-
ized network achieving the same sum-capacity of its cen-
tralized counterpart. We will quantify the corresponding
sub-optimality through simulation results.
3.4. Spatial power allocation game
In this section we assume that the user are free to share their
transmit power between their antennas but for each realiza-
tion of the coordination signal the transmit power is con-
strained as follows: ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, ∀s ∈ {1, 2}, Tr(Q
(s)
k ) ≤
Pk. This means that we assume that the users cannot dis-
tribute their power over time: they cannot decide the amount
of power they dedicate to a given realization of the coordi-
nation signal. The main feature of the game under the afore-
mentioned power constraint is that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in each sub-game defined by the realization of
the coordination signal. The proof is much simpler than
that of the time power allocation problem since the use of
Rosen’s Theorem [9] is not required. Without loss of gen-
erality assume that S = 1. Whatever the strategy of user
2, user 1 sees no multiple access interference. Therefore he
can chooseQ
(1)
1 independently of user 2. AsR
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
is a strictly concave function to be maximized over a convex
set, there is a unique optimum strategy for user 1. As we as-
sume a game with complete information, user 2 knows the
utility of user 1 and thus the precoding matrix he chooses.
The same concavity argument can be used forR
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
and therefore guarantees that user 2 will use a given precod-
ing matrix.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to find
the optimum covariance matrices we proceed in the same
way as described in [8]. First we will focus on the opti-
mum eigenvectors and then we will determine the optimum
eigenvectors by approximating the utility functions under
the large system assumption. In order to determine the op-
timum eigenvectors the proof in [8] can be applied to our
case to assert that there is no loss of optimality by restricting
the search for the optimum covariance matrix by imposing
the structure Qk = UkPkUk, where Tk = UkDkUk is
the spectral decomposition of the transmit correlation ma-
trix defined in (11) and the diagonal matrix
Pk = Diag(Pk(1), ..., Pk(nt)) represents the powers of
user k allocated to the different eigenvectors.
As a consequence, we can exploit once again the re-
sults of [12], assuming the asymptotic regime in terms of
the number of antennas, defined in the previous subsection.
The new approximated utilities are:
R˜
(1)
1 =
nt∑
i=1
log2
[
1 + ρP
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)γ1
]
+
+
∑
j = 1nr log2
[
1 + ρd(R)(j)δ1
]
− ntργ1δ1 log2 e
R˜
(1)
2 =
2∑
l=1
nt∑
i=1
log2
[
1 + 2ρP
(1)
l (i)dl(i)γ2
]
+
+
nr∑
j=1
log2
[
1 + 2ρd(R)(j)δ2
]
− 4ntργ2δ2 log2 e−
−R˜
(1)
1
(24)
where dl, l ∈ {1, 2} are the vectors that contain the
eigenvalues of the transmit correlation matrices Tl, d
(R)
contains the eigenvalues of the receive correlation matrix
R. Also the coefficients γ1, δ1, γ2,δ2 are the solutions of
the following systems


γ1 =
1
nt
nr∑
j=1
d(R)(j)
1 + ρd(R)(j)δ1
δ1 =
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
P
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)
1 + ρP
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)1γ1
(25)


γ2 =
1
2nt
nr∑
j=1
d(R)(j)
1 + 2ρd(R)(j)δ2
δ2 =
1
2nt
2∑
l=1
nt∑
i=1
P
(1)
l (i)dl(i)
1 + 2ρP
(1)
l (i)dl(i)1γ2
(26)
Then, optimizing the approximated rates R˜
(1)
1 w. r. t. P
(1)
1 (i),
and then R˜
(1)
2 w.r.t. P
(1)
1 (i) leads to the following water-
filling equations:
P
(1),∗
1 (i) =
[
1
nr ln 2λ1
−
1
ρd1(i)γ1
]+
(27)
P
(1),∗
2 (i) =
[
1
nr ln 2λ2
−
1
ρd2(i)γ2
]+
(28)
where λk ≥ 0 and for user k is the Lagrangian multipliers
tuned in order to meet the power constraint given in (15):∑nt
i=1 P
(1)
k (i) = ntPk. We use the same iterative power al-
location algorithm as the one described in [8]. As we have
mentioned in the previous subsection, the results of [13]
show that the approximated utilities are strictly concave, but
also that if the iterative power algorithm converges, it con-
verges towards the global maximum. We obtain in this case
also that, under the large systems assumption, the approxi-
mated utilities have the same properties as the exact utilities.
One important point to notice here is that the obtained
optimum precoding matrices do not depend on p. This con-
siderably simplifies the base station’s choice for the sum-
rate optimal value for p. Indeed, the sum-rate Rsum(p) is
merely a linear function of p: Rsum(p) = ap + b where
a = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(1),∗
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH1Q
(2),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2),∗
2 H
H
2 |
b = E log |I + ρH1Q
(2),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2),∗
2 H
H
2 |.
(29)
Depending on the sign of a , if the base station wants to
maximize the sum-rate it will choose p = 0 or p = 1. If it
wants a fair game it will choose p = 12 and accept a certain
loss of global optimality. Note that even for p ∈ {0, 1} the
sum-capacity is not reached in general: this is because the
matrix Q
(1),∗
1 (resp. Q
(2),∗
2 ) does not coincide with the first
(resp. second) component of the pair of precoding matrices
that maximizes the (strictly concave) network sum-rate.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
For the temporal power allocation problem we have seen
that the decentralized MAC depends on the rule of the game
i.e. the value of p. This is exactly what Fig. 1 depicts
for the following scenario: P1 = 10, P2 = 1, ρ = 5 dB,
nt = nr = 4. First, we see that the MAC sum-rate is
a convex function of p and the maximum of Rsum(p) is
reached for p = 0 and p = 1. One important observation to
be made is that the minimum and maximum only differ by
about 1%. Many other simulations have confirmed this ob-
servation. This shows that the sub-optimality is not marked.
This means that any game rule can lead to a almost sum-rate
optimal game, this holds in particular for a fair game. Fig. 2
shows the set of rate pair achieved by varying p from 0 to 1.
The corresponding looks like a straight line and is very close
to the sum-rate line given by the equation R1 +R2 = Csum
where Csum is the centralized MAC sum-capacity. It is in-
teresting to note that the base station can, through a single
parameter (i.e. p), force the system to operate at different
many points which corresponds to relatively large ranges of
transmission rates. It is also very interesting to note, that
the fast MIMO MAC behaves like a Gaussian SISO MAC
in the sense that the capacity region border comprises a seg-
ment over which the sum-rate is reached (up to a small er-
ror). This is not true for fast fading SISO MACs. Here,
we observe the consequence of the double averaging effect
present in the considered utilities (ergodic rates plus spatial
averaging). This shows that, although the ergodic capacity
region of the centralized MAC with CSIR and CDIT is not
known in general, it can be determined up to a small relative
error under the large system approximation and therefore
make possible the analysis of the decentralized MAC.
Now we consider the purely spatial power allocation
problem. We already know that the sum-rate is a linear
function of p and therefore is maximum in p = 0 or p = 1.
It turns out that this slope has a small value. This obser-
vation has been confirmed by many simulation scenarios.
This slope is even 0 for a symmetric MAC i.e. P1 = P2 and
T1 = T2. This can be checked analytically by inspecting
the sum-rate expression. Fig. 3 shows the set of rate pairs
achieved by varying p for the scenario: P1 = 10, P2 = 1,
ρ = 3 dB, nt = nr = 5, t1 = t2 = 0.2 where tk is the cor-
relation parameter that characterize the correlation matrix
chosen to be given by Tk(i, j) = t
|i−j|
k . Even in this sce-
nario, chosen to be a bad case in terms of sub-optimality, the
sum-rate is not far from the sum-capacity of the centralized
MAC.
5. SUMMARY
In this contribution, we have provided a game-theoretic frame-
work for decentralized multiple access channels using a sim-
ple coordination mechanism. We have provided several in-
teresting theoretical and simulation results. First, we proved
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium both for
decentralized Gaussian SISO and fast fading MIMOMACs.
We also provided the corresponding optimum selfish power
allocation policies. We have seen that the base station can,
through a single parameter (i.e. p ∈ [0, 1], which represents
the distribution of the coordination signal), force the system
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Figure 1: Temporal power allocation case. MAC sum-rate versus
p for P1 = 10, P2 = 1,nr = nt = 4, ρ = 5dB. The sum-rate of
fading MIMO MACs is almost reached whatever the coordination
signal distribution.
to operate at different many points which corresponds to rel-
atively large ranges of of transmission rates. For Gaussian
MACs with single antenna terminals, the corresponding set
of rates corresponds to the full cooperation segment of the
centralized MAC. Said otherwise a decentralized Gaussian
SISO MAC with coordination achieves the same rate pairs
as a MAC with full cooperation or virtual MIMO system.
As a second step we wanted to know to what extent this
key result extends to fading MAC with multi-antenna ter-
minals. It turns out this is almost true in the MIMO setting.
For the cases of interest where the power was optimally al-
located either over space or time, the performance gap is
relatively small. Interestingly in large MIMO MACs, the
capacity region comprises a full cooperation segment just
like SISO MACs. The coordination signal precisely allows
one to move along the corresponding (almost) straight line.
This shows the relevance of large systems in distributed net-
works since they allow to determine the capacity region of
certain systems whereas it is unknown in the finite setting
and also induce an averaging effect, which makes the behav-
ior or users predictable. Indeed, in large MIMO MACs the
knowledge of the CDIT does not involve any performance
w.r.t. the case with perfect CSIT.
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